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- r-,-i- v Hi, Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Annotated 78-2a3(2)(h; (I9M6;
S T A T E M E N T O t ; ISSUES P R E S E N T E D FOR REVIEW
The issues on appeal relate to the trial court awarding alimony. The Appellant
contends that the trial court committed error in awarding alimony and relies up m ihivi lint nil
reasoning to '"" 1" l11 * ""
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Deten
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v

* hether the Trial Court Erre4 by Awarding Alimony to a Party Who Had
* '• hahiied Since the Date of Separation?
tl lei gi vet i, ch cumstances constitute "cohabitation, is in reality a

mixed question of fact and law , and the appellate court is not bound b) the conclusion reached
by the trial court In reviewing a trial court's actions in a divorce case, the appellate :oi n I: is
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vested with broad equitable powers. Haddow v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985).
Challenging Findings of Fact in a divorce action utilized a clearly erroneous standard. Barnes
v. Barnes. 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993). Issues of law are reviewed under the
correction of error standard. Bingham v. Bingham. 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994).
The Appellant preserved this issue for appeal through the examination of multiple
witnesses regarding the issue of cohabitation (T. 10, 17, 29, 34). This issue was further
preserved for appeal by the trial court's finding that the Respondent had not cohabited since
the parties' separation (R. 19).
2.

Whether the Trial Court Erred by Awarding Alimony Retroactively to the Time
of Separation?

This is an issue of law requiring the trial court's conclusions to be reviewed for
correctness. Bingham v. Bingham. 872 P.2d 1065,1067 (Utah App. 1994).
This issue was preserved for appeal by the trial court's finding which awarded alimony
retroactively to the time of separation (R. 18).
3.

Whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony by failing to consider the
financial ability and needs of the parties?

This is an issue of law which requires the trial court's conclusions to reviewed for
correctness. Bingham v. Bingham. 872 P.2d 1065.1067 (Utah App. 1994).
This issue is preserved for appeal by the trial court's finding which based the award of
alimony primarily on the disparity of the income of the parties (R. 18).
i

DISPOSITIVE STATUTES & RULES
The interpretation of the following statutes and rules are important in resolving the
issues on appeal in this matter:

<
2
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I Hah Code '\nnofiilniI \[Vl-\ (1993).
(1) In any action tiled
: > establish an ordci ^T
alimom . oi ;li ision of
proper!> in a domestic case, the court ma\ ^rdei a part) to pa\ the ^ost^

m o n e u during me pendenc} of the action, for the separate support and
maintenance of the other part). . .

I Jtah Code AIL. .. - ^u-3-5(7)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1998)
(a) The ,. n ^hM consider at least the foil*• .
in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the iccipient spouse.
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability u* produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support: and
(iv) the length of the marriage,
(b) I he court may consider the fault of the r \ u i - - .n Je-.u mining .ihmom
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard ot living, existing at
the time of separation, in determining alimony in aca>tdance with Subsection
(<o However, the coun shall considci all relevant facts and equitable principles
and may. in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at
the time of rrial In marriages of short duration, when no children have been
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of
living that existed at the time of the marriage
(d) The court may. under appropriate circumstances attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standard- of h u n g

Utah Code Annotated

JU-3-5(9)

A m order of the court that a pai t> pa\ alimony to a former spouse terminates
upon establishment h\ the party paying alimom •!> v :ht.- lormer spouse is
r *!v;hi!:uinr " i'H r-'-h/ 1 -• '»:<*"

I Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3(b)
. Rule 3. Commencement of action f I > ) 1 ime of ' ( "ut i $'< fiction
The court shall have jurisdiction from the nine oi tiling of the complaint or
service of the summons and a cop} of die compiai-

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case & Proceedings Below.
, This appeal is from a final judgment or decree awarding alimony in the divorce

proceeding between the parties.
1. The Petitioner, Jose Rafael Ortiz-Uribe filed a Petition for Divorce on November 12,
1997 (R. 2). The Respondent, Laurie Ortiz-Uribe, answered the Petition for Divorce on
December 8, 1997 (R. 7).
2. A Request for Trial Setting was filed by the Petitioner on December 10, 1997 (R. 9).
At the pre-trial settlement and scheduling conference held on February 23, 1998, a trial date was
scheduled to try the issues of alimony and debts (R. 12, 13).
3. The matter came for trial on March 17, 1998. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial
court entered its Ruling which was subsequently incorporated into Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Decree of Divorce (R. 20, 23).
4. The Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal on April 21, 1998 (R. 25).
B.

Statement of Facts.
Jose Rafael Ortiz-Uribe (Ortiz) and Laurie Ortiz-Uribe (Uribe) first married on the 24th

day of December, 1984. That marriage was annulled due to the incapacity of Ms. Uribe to marry
because she was not divorced from her previous husband. (R. 20, Tr. 40). The parties
subsequently remarried on November 21, 1985. (R. 19, Tr. 40).
In August of 1996, the parties separated.. (R. 19). Mr. Ortiz filed a petition for divorce on
November 12, 1997. (R. 2). A trial on the matter was heard on March 17, 1998, to determine

4
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issues of alimony and debts. (R. 13). Prior to the trial date, Ms. Uribe did not request a
temporary order for alimony.
Following the parties separation, Ms. Uribe had different men living with her in her
mobile home. Ms. Uribe admitted to having a relationship with a Brady Dalton with whom they
had sexual relations on a frequent basis. (Tr. 21-22). Though he rented an apartment up the street
from Ms. Uribe, he was at the home of Ms. Uribe frequently during the days and nights. (Tr. 15,
22). The two also spent time together at Dalton's apartment. (Tr. 22). Ms. Uribe took care of
Dalton's things, and Dalton took care of her things. (Tr. 22). Dalton had frequent use of Ms.
Uribe's car (Tr. 14, 31), and helped buy tires for the car. (Tr. 22). It appeared as though Ms.
Uribe and Dalton were living together in Ms. Uribe's trailer as boyfriend and girlfriend. (Tr. 31).
Dalton acted as though he were the man of the house. (Tr. 34).

On January 23, 1998, Dalton

died in Ms. Uribe's bed, accidentally overdosing on cocaine (Tr. 22-23).
Shortly after Brady Dalton's death, a Michael Withers died in the home of Ms. Uribe. He
overdosed on heroin. (Tr. 23). Ms. Uribe also had Jack and Jake Nyland living at her house
following the separation. (Tr. 16). They were long time friends. (Tr. 24).
Mr. Ortiz earned $23,000 in 1997 (Tr. 12), and reported on his financial declaration that
his monthly income was $1,960. (Tr. 47). Mr. Ortiz listed his financial needs on his financial
declaration and testified that those needs were as outlined on his financial declaration.1
]

The financial declarations prepared and submitted by the parties are not in the court's file
at this time. The appellant has no explanation for this, and only became aware of this fact when
preparing for this appeal. The court clerk could not locate or provide an explanation as to why
the financial declarations were not in the file. The record indicates that the trial court
acknowledged receiving the financial declarations and referred to them during the trial. The
court indicated that it had received Ms. Uribe's financial declaration at the pre-trial. (Tr. 19).
The Court's Minute Entry indicates that Mr. Ortiz filed a financial declaration with the court
5
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At the time of trial, Ms. Uribe was working as a supervisor of housekeeping and laundry
at the Hidden Hollow Care Center, where she had worked for over a year. (Tr. 18). Ms. Uribe
worked 40 hours a week and earned $7.75. (Tr. 18-21). Though Ms. Uribe acknowledged
earning $310 a week (Tr. 21), she reported a gross monthly income of $835.53 on her financial
declaration. (Tr. 47). Ms. Uribe testified that her monthly financial needs totaled $660. (Tr. 1920).
Based upon Mr. Ortiz's earnings as set forth in his financial declaration, $1,960 a month,
and Ms. Uribe's earnings as set forth in her financial declaration, $835.53 a month, the trial court
granted Ms. Uribe's request of $200 a month alimony. The alimony award was based on the
disparity of income of the parties. (R. 18) (Tr. 47).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Following the parties separation in August of 1996, Ms. Uribe cohabited with one or
more men. It is clear that Ms. Uribe resided with a person of the opposite sex with whom she
was having a sexual relationship. It was an abuse of the trial court's equitable powers in
awarding alimony.
It was improper for the trial court to award alimony retroactively. The trial did not have
jurisdiction to award alimony retroactively to August of 1996, the time of separation.
Jurisdiction for the court should have commenced from the time of the filing of the petition for
divorce or service of the summons and a copy of the petition. In addition, Ms. Uribe did not

during his opening statements at the trial. (R. 15). Appellant has made copies of the financial
declarations from his own file and attached as an addendum for the Appellate Court's reference.
Mr. Ortiz listed his financial needs which totaled $1,500.
6
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request separate support and maintenance during the pendency of the action. She established no
financial need prior to the entry of the divorce decree.
The trial court failed to recognize and consider essential factors in determining whether
alimony should be awarded: (1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for herself; and (3) the ability of the
responding spouse to provide support. The trial court considered the length of the marriage and
based alimony on the disparity of income of the parties. Reviewing the financial conditions and
needs of the parties, there is not a disparity of income.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING ALIMONY TO MS. URIBE
WHERE SHE COHABITED WITH ANOTHER PERSON FOLLOWING THE
PARTIES SEPARATION.
In Utah, it is well established that cohabitation warrants termination of alimony. Barber
v. Barber. 792 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah App. 1990). Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(9) states: "Any
order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person." Id.. There
have been various versions of this statute in use during the past few years, but the court of
appeals has determined that the semantic distinctions regarding cohabitation are inconsequential.
"Cohabitation is comprised of the same two elements: (1) common residency and (2) sexual
contact evidencing a conjugal association." Pendleton v. Pendleton. 918 P.2d 159, 160 [FN1]
(Utah App. 1996); citing Haddow. v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985).
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As in Pendelton, at 160, sexual contact by Ms. Uribe has been admitted. Ms. Uribe
admitted to having a relationship with Brady Dalton with whom they had sexual relations on a
frequent basis. (Tr. 21-22). In marshalling the evidence to support the trial court's finding that
Ms. Uribe did not cohabit following the separation, the element of residency must be addressed.
The only evidence presented at trial establishing that there was not a common residency was
through the testimony of Ms. Uribe. When asked whether it was true that Brady Dalton lived in
her home, she responded "No, it's not. He stayed there. I can't say whether he's living there or
not. He did stay there overnight once in awhile, and sometimes during the day." (Tr. 21-22). She
further testified that Dalton rented an apartment just up the street from her place. (Tr. 22). Uribe
denied that she and Dalton carried on as though they were husband and wife. (Tr. 22). Uribe also
denied that Dalton contributed to her financial support, though he did help her buy tires for the
car. (Tr.22).
Ms. Uribe herself admitted that Brady Dalton lived at her place on a frequent basis.
During her cross examination of Mr. Ortiz, Uribe stated "Yes, he did drive my car. Yes, he
stayed overnight there quite often." (Tr. 15-16). She then asked "Who else lived at my house?"
(Tr. 16), of which Ortiz answered "Who else? I know Jack and Jake Nylund. (Tr. 16). Uribe
then responded through her next question, "Right, Jack and Jake Nylund lived at the house". (Tr.
16). Uribe then compared Brady Dalton to Jack and Jake Nylund as just friends staying with her.
The problem with this comparison, or at least as admitted to by Uribe, is that she had frequent
sexual contact with Dalton, evidencing a conjugal association.
It appeared to Robert Bosserman, as though Ms. Uribe and Dalton were living together in
Ms. Uribe's trailer as boyfriend and girlfriend. (Tr. 31). Dalton appeared to live there (Tr. 32) as
8
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he drove Uribe's car (Tr. 30), and used Uribe's household items as though he were the man of
the house. (Tr. 34). Another witness, Ramon Perez, went to Ms. Uribe's mobile home a couple
of times a month to pick up his mail which was delivered there from Mexico. (Tr. 35). Each
time Perez went to the mobile home, Brady Dalton was there. On one occasion, Perez observed
Uribe and Dalton sleeping in her bed. (Tr. 36). Dalton actually died in Uribe's bed, accidentally
overdosing on cocaine. (Tr. 22-23).
According to Uribe, she would also go to Dalton's apartment on a frequent basis? (Tr.
22). The fact that Dalton rented a separate apartment, does not in and of itself defeat the element
of a common residency. Common residency means "the sharing of a common abode that both
parties consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time." Sigg
v. Sigg. 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah App. 1995), citing Haddow. at 672. In Sigg, it was determined
that when Ms. Sigg returned from New Zealand, she and her paramour "in effect resided
together," even though they had separate condominiums. "The two had a sexual relationship,
shared living expenses, had open access to each other's condominiums, ate together and shared
food expenses, kept clothing in the same condominium, used the same furniture and 'otherwise
lived as though they were husband and wife.'" kL at 917. In the instant case, Uribe and Dalton
had a sexual relationship, had open access to Uribe's mobile home and Dalton's apartment,
shared Uribe's cars, and used each other's household items as though they were living together as
husband and wife.
Though Uribe testified that Dalton did not contribute to her financial support (Tr. 22), it
is likely that he benefitted from her support, if indeed he was unemployed as reported by Uribe.
(Tr.
9
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23). Even so, the sharing of the financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of a
household is not considered to be a requisite element of cohabitation. Haddow. at 673.
In view of the facts of the present case, it is clear that Ms. Uribe and Brady Dalton had in
effect resided together. The common residency element of cohabitation has clearly been
established. It was clearly erroneous for the trial court to award alimony to Ms. Uribe.

POINT II
IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO AWARD ALIMONY
RETROACTIVELY TO THE TIME OF SEPARATION AS JURISDICTION
FOR THE COURT DID NOT COMMENCE UNTIL THE TIME OF FILING OF
THE PETITION FOR DIVORCE AND TEMPORARY ALIMONY WAS NOT
REQUESTED BY MS. URIBE.
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly establishes that jurisdiction of the
court begins at the time an action is commenced through the filing of a complaint. This rule
states: "The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing of the complaint or service of
the summons and a copy of the complaint." Utah R. Civ. P. 3(b).
In the instant case, the petition for divorce was filed on November 12, 1997. (R. 2). The
summons and petition were served on November 17, 1997. (R. 5). The parties separated in
August of 1996. (R. 19). The trial court awarded Ms. Uribe $200 a month from the time of the
separation in August of 1996. (Tr. 47) (R. 22). Mr. Uribe was ordered to pay back the retroactive
delinquency at the rate of $ 100 per month. (Tr. 51) (R. 22).
According to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the parties to award alimony prior to November 12, 1997. It was improper for

i
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the trial court to award alimony retroactively from the date of separation to the date the petition
for divorce was filed.
In Shelton v. Shelton. 885 P.2d 807 (Utah App. 1994), an award of retroactive alimony
was recognized as a proper exercise of discretion. However, the retroactivity was regarding the
award of temporary alimony. In Shelton, the husband had deceived the trial court regarding his
income at the time of the initial hearing which addressed temporary alimony. An award of
retroactive alimony was awarded to the time the divorce action was filed. WL
During the pendency of the divorce action, Uribe never requested temporary support and
maintenance as permitted by Utah Code Annotated 30-3-3(3). According to her financial
declaration and testimony, her income was greater than her financial needs.2 Uribe established
no financial need prior to the trial date. It is unclear why the trial court awarded retroactive
alimony, except that that is what Uribe requested at trial. (Tr. 39).
It was improper for the trial court to award alimony retroactively. The trial did not have
jurisdiction to award alimony retroactively to August of 1996, the time of separation. As a
matter of law, jurisdiction for the court did not commence until the time of the filing of the
petition for divorce or service of the summons and a copy of the petition. In addition, Ms. Uribe
did not request separate support and maintenance during the pendency of the action. She
established no financial need prior to the trial date.

2

This is addressed more fully in Point III of the argument.
11
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE AND CONSIDER THE
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS, NEEDS, AND ABILITIES OF THE PARTIES
WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS IN DETERMINING WHETHER
ALIMONY SHOULD BE AWARDED.
Though a trial court has broad discretion in making an award of alimony, its discretion
must be exercised within the appropriate legal standards. See Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d
421, 423 (Utah App. 1990). The decision to award alimony must also be supported with
adequate findings and conclusions. Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988).
As recently pointed out in Childs v. Childs. 353 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10 (Utah App. 1998)
Section 30-3-5(7)(a) of the Utah Code establishes four factors a trial court must consider in
determining alimony: (1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (3) the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support; and (4) the length of the marriage. Childs at 10; Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(7)(a)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1998). The trial court may also consider fault in determining alimony. .See
id §30-3-5(7)(b) (Supp. 1998).
In the instant case, the trial court only found that there was a disparity of income between
the parties and a long term marriage. (Tr. 47). Based upon the earnings of the parties as set forth
in each of their financial declarations, the trial court found that the disparity of income
necessitated the award of alimony. The court granted Uribe's request of $200 a month alimony.
(Tr.47)(R. 18).
Though Ms. Uribe worked 40 hours a week and earned $7.75 (Tr. 18-21) (R. 19), which
translates to earnings of $310 a week, the trial court found that the better evidence regarding her

12
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earnings was the amount set forth in her financial declaration of $835.53 a month. (Tr. 47) (R.
19). The court stated that even if it accepted the posture that Uribe earned over $1,200 a month,
it would still justify the $200 a month in alimony. (Tr. 49).
The trial court failed to consider the financial condition and needs of Ms. Uribe as well as
her earning capacity. She testified that her monthly financial needs, as reported on her financial
declaration, were $660 a month. (Tr. 19-20). Even if her earnings were recognized as only
$835.53 a month, her financial needs would be met. The court, failed to credit her for the
additional $400 a month earning capacity which she was actually earning. Without an award of
alimony, Uribe can more than adequately meet her financial needs. An additional $200 a month
from alimony is simply additional spending money.
On the other hand, looking at Mr. Ortiz's financial condition, there is little money left
over after paying his expenses to pay alimony. The trial totally failed to consider Mr. Ortiz's
ability to provide support. With earnings of $1,960 a month (Tr. 47), Ortiz reported on his
financial declaration that his expenses were $1,500 a month. What his net income would be,
would barely meet his monthly expenses. In addition, the trial court found that because of the
disparity of income, Ortiz should pay the U.S. West telephone obligation in the sum of $1,120.
(R. 18) (Tr. 46). On top of this, Ortiz was ordered to pay the delinquent retroactive alimony
accrued during the past seventeen months which totalled $3,400 at the rate of $100 per month.
By imposing ongoing and retroactive alimony payments upon Ortiz was financially
overwhelming to him. He clearly had little ability to provide support.
The trial court failed to recognize and consider essential factors in determining whether
alimony should be awarded. The parties respective financial conditions, needs, and abilities were
13
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not considered. As a matter of law, these factors must be considered. Through a proper analysis
of the parties abilities and needs, it is apparent that a serious inequity has resulted by awarding
alimony to Uribe.

CONCLUSION
It was improper for the trial court to award alimony to Ms. Uribe in that she cohabitated
following the separation with Brady Dalton. The two requisite elements of cohabitation have
been met. Uribe and Dalton undeniably had frequent sexual contact evidencing a conjugal
association. The common residency element has clearly been established. The facts indicate that
Uribe and Dalton had in effect resided together. Mr. Ortiz requests that the appellate court
reverse the trial court's order awarding alimony on the basis that Uribe cohabitated following the
separation of the parties.
As a matter of law, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to award alimony retroactively
from the time the petition for divorce was filed to the time of the parties separation. Jurisdiction
commenced once the petition for divorce was filed. It was also improper for the trial court to
award alimony retroactively from the date of trial to the time that the petition for divorce was
filed. Ms. Uribe did not establish a need nor did she request temporary alimony pending the
divorce action. If the award of alimony is affirmed, the order for retroactive alimony should be
reversed.
The trial court failed to consider the parties financial conditions, needs, and abilities in
determining the award of alimony. As a matter of law, these factors must be considered. It was
improper for the trial court to base alimony on the disparity of the parties income. A close
i
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evaluation of the parties financial conditions, needs, and abilities, shows that there is little
disparity of income. Mr. Ortiz respectfully requests that the award of alimony be reversed on the
basis that the trial court failed to properly consider the parties financial conditions, needs, and
abilities, and there was little disparity of income to award alimony. At a minimum, the matter
should be remanded for the trial court to consider the required factors in awarding alimony.

DATED THIS ID

4k>
day of November, 1998.

ROBERT L. MOODY

Hv

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

JOSE ORTIZ-URIBE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 981224

LAURIE ORTIZ-URIBE,
Defendant/Appellee.

I hereby certify that on this 23rd of November, 1998,1 mailed two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, postage prepaid, to the following:
Laurie Lyn Ortiz-Uribe
441 South State Street #16
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Section
30-3-11.1.
30-3-11.2.
30-3-11.3.

30-3-12.
30-3-13.
30-3-13.1.
30-3-14.
30-3-14.1.
30-3-15.
30-3-15.1.

30-3-15.2.
30-3-15.3.
30-3-15.4.
30-3-16.
30-3-16.1.
30-3-16.2.
30-3-16.3.
30-3-16.4.
30-3-16.5.
30-3-16.6.
30-3-16.7.
30-3-17.
30-3-17.1.
30-3-18.

30-3-19 to
30-3-32.
30-3-33.
30-3-34.
30-3-35.
30-3-35.5.
30-3-36.
30-3-37.
30-3-38.

HUSBAND AND WIFE
Family Court Act — Purpose.
Appointment of counsel for child.
Mandatory educational course for divorcing
parents — Purpose — Curriculum — Exceptions.
Courts to exercise family counseling powers.
Repealed.
Establishment of family court division of district court.
Repealed.
Designation of judges — Terms.
Repealed.
Appointment of domestic relations counselors,
family court commissioner, and assistants
and clerks.
Repealed.
Commissioners — Powers.
Salaries and expenses.
Repealed.
Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers.
Petition for conciliation.
Contents of petition.
Procedure upon filing of petition.
Fees.
Information not available to public.
Effect of petition — Pendency of action.
Power and jurisdiction of judge.
Proceedings deemed confidential — Written
evaluation by counselor.
Waiting period for hearing after filing for divorce — Exemption — Use of counseling and
education services not to be construed as
condonation or promotion.
30 •3-31. Repealed.
Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definitions.
Advisory guidelines.
Best interests — Rebuttable presumption.
Minimum schedule for visitation for children 5
to 18 years of age.
Minimum schedule for visitation for children
under five years of age.
Special circumstances.
Relocation.
Pilot Program for Expedited Visitation Enforcement.

30-3-1. P r o c e d u r e — R e s i d e n c e — Grounds.
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as
provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as
provided in this chapter.
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent on the
grounds specified in Subsection (3) in all cases where the
petitioner or respondent has been an actual and bona fide
resident of this state and of the county where the action is
brought, or if members of the armed forces of the United
States who are not legal residents of this state, where the
petitioner has been stationed in this state under military
orders, for three months next prior to the commencement of
the action.
(3) Grounds for divorce:
(a) impotency of the respondent at the time of marriage;
(b) adultery committed by the respondent subsequent
to marriage;
(c) willful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent
for more than one year;

30-3-3

(d) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the
petitioner the common necessaries of life;
(e> habitual drunkenness of the respondent;
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony;
(g) cruel treatment of the petitioner by the respondent
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental
distress to the petitioner;
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
(i) incurable insanity; or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately
under a decree of separate maintenance of any state for
three consecutive years without cohabitation.
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does
not affect the liability of either party under any provision for
separate maintenance previously granted.
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of
insanity unless:
(i) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the
appropriate authorities of this or another state prior
to the commencement of the action; and
(ii) the court finds by the testimony of competent
witnesses t h a t the insanity of the respondent is
incurable.
(b) The court shall appoint for the respondent a guardian ad litem who shall protect the interests of the respondent. A copy of the summons and complaint shall be
served on the respondent in person or by publication, as
provided by the laws of this state in other actions for
divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the
county attorney for the county where the action is prosecuted.
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of
the case and if the respondent resides out of this state,
take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and
make a defense as is just to protect the rights of the
respondent and the interests of the state.
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction
over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property,
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent
resides in this state, upon notice, have the respondent
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of
th£ respondent by two or more competent physicians, to
determine the mental condition of the respondent. For
this purpose either party may have leave from the court to
enter any asylum or institution where the respondent
may be confined. The costs of court in this action shall be
apportioned by the court.
1997
30-3-2. R i g h t of h u s b a n d to divorce.
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife
for the same causes and in the same manner as the wife may
obtain a divorce from her husband.
1953
30-3-3.

Award of c o s t s , a t t o r n e y and w i t n e s s fees —
Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and
in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case,
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The
order may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining t h a t the party substantially prevailed upon the
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party
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is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other
party and of any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of
the action or in the final order or judgment.
1993

30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affidavit — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the
petitioner or petitioner's attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be submitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the approval of the court.
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both
parties have attended the mandatory course described in
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of
course completion to the court. The court may waive this
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of
the parties, if it determines course attendance and
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in
the best interest of the parties.
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's
affidavit.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
1997
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4.

Repealed.

1990

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of debts — Court to have continuing
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the
following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for the dependent children;
.. (c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during
marriage;

(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding
the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other members of the immediate family, the
court shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision,
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under
this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court
determines that the petition was without merit and not
asserted or defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise
court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in
determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a).
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider the standard of living that existed at
the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances,
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of
living.
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(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change
shall be considered in dividing the marital property and
in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short
duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived
or born during the marriage, the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the
time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a
new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify t h a t action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent
spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer
than the number of years that the marriage existed
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage
of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled
and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the
action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with
another person.
1997

30-3-5.1. Provision for income withholding in child
support order.
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, it shall
include in the order a provision for withholding income as a
means of collecting child support as provided in Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
1997
30-3-5.2.

Allegations of child abuse or child sexual

abuse — Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for
modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or
child sexual abuse is made, implicating either party, the court
shall order that an investigation be conducted by the Division
of Child and Family Services within the Department of
Human Services in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 4a. A
final award of custody or visitation may not be rendered until
a report on that investigation is received by the court. That
investigation shall be conducted by the Division of Child and

30-3-10

Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and
request for an investigation. In reviewing this report, the
court shall comply with Section 78-7-9.
1996
30-3-5.5, 30-3-6.

Repealed.

1991,1993

30-3-7. When d e c r e e b e c o m e s absolute.
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute:
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by
the clerk in the register of actions if both the parties who
have a child or children have completed attendance at the
mandatory course for divorcing parents as provided in
Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court waives the requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of the
parties, upon determination that course attendance and
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in
the best interest of the parties;
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may
specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending; or
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute,
for sufficient cause otherwise orders.
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for
good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a designated
period of time before the decree becomes absolute, but not to
exceed six months from the signing and entry of the decree.
1994

30-3-8. R e m a r r i a g e — When unlawful.
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their
marriage by decree may marry any person other than the
spouse from whom the divorce was granted until it becomes
absolute. If an appeal is taken, the divorce is not absolute until
after affirmance of the decree.
1988
30-3-9.

Repealed.

30-3-10.

1969

Custody of children in case of separation or
divorce — Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court
shall make an order for the future care and custody of the
minor children as it considers appropriate. In determining
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of
each of the parties. The court may inquire of the children and
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the
future custody, but the expressed desires are not controlling
and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among
other factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most
likely to act in the best interests of the child, including
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the
noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody
of the child, or has attempted to permanently relinquish
custody to a third party, it shall take that evidence into
consideration in determining whether to award custody to the
other parent.
(4) (a) A court may not discriminate against a parent due
to a disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding
custody or determining whether a substantial change has
occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody.
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in
awarding custody or determining whether a substantial
change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an
award of custody, the parent with a disability may rebut
any evidence, presumption, or inference arising therefrom
by showing that:
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the parent's ability to provide for the
physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302
MOODY & BROWN
Attorneys for Petitioner
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 373-2721

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOSE RAFAEL ORTIZ-URIBE,

:

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
v.

:

LAURIE ORTIZ-URIBE,

:

Respondent.

Civil No. 974402506
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr.

:

The above entitled matter having come on regularly for trial on the 17th day of
March, 1998, and the Petitioner having presented evidence and the Respondent having presented
evidence and the court having considered the same and having made in writing its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1. Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Respondent, the
same to become final upon the signing and entry in the Registry of Actions.
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2. Each of the parties are hereby awarded the personalty now in their respective
possessions as a full and complete property settlement.
3. Petitioner is ordered to pay to the Respondent alimony in the sum of $200.00
per month retroactive to August of 1996 and continuing from said date until the Respondent's
remarriage, co-habitation or for five years, whichever occurs first.
4. Petitioner is ordered to pay the delinquent support which has accrued pursuant
to the Findings of Fact made by this court in the sum of $100.00 per month. Petitioner is
ordered to pay said $100.00 together with $200.00 per month alimony commencing on the 25th
day of March, 1998, and continuing on the 10th and 25th of each month thereafter until
Respondent's remarriage, cohabitation or the expiration of five years from August 1996,
whichever occurs first.
5. Petitioner is ordered to pay the judgment against the Respondent with Knight
Adjustment Bureau and to hold Respondent harmless from liability thereon.
6. Respondent's maiden name, Paskett, is hereby restored.
DATED this / V ' c f a y of March, 1998.

B>^HE COURT:
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\Y M. WARDING, JR.
Judge
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NOTICE TO RESPONDENT
TO:

Laurie Ortiz-Uribe
441 South State, #16
Orem, Utah 84058
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, Attorney for

Petitioner, will submit the above and foregoing Decree of Divorce to the Honorable Ray M.
Harding, Jr., for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice,
plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to
Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this \&

day of March, 1998.

ROBERT L. MOODY
Attorney for Petitioner
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302
MOODY & BROWN
Attorneys for Petitioner
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 373-2721

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOSE RAFAEL ORTIZ-URIBE,
Petitioner,

:
:

v.

:

LAURIE ORTIZ-URIBE,

:

Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 974402506
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr.

:

The above entitled matter having come on regularly for trial on the 17th day of
March, 1998, and Petitioner being present and being represented by counsel, Robert L. Moody,
and Respondent being present pro se and the court having heard the Stipulation of the parties
and evidence with regard to alimony and the debt owing to U.S. West and being fully advised
in the premises:
NOW ENTERS THE FOLLOWING:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The court finds that the parties first married on the 24th day of December,
1984, that marriage was annulled due to the incapacity of the Respondent to marry the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Petitioner, and they were remarried in November of 1995, and since that time have been, and
now are, husband and wife.
2. The court finds that the parties have been residents of Utah County, State of
Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of this action.
3.

The court finds that the parties have developed irreconcilable differences

making the continuation of the marriage impossible.
4. The court finds that no children have been born as issue to the marriage and
none are expected.
5. The court finds that the parties have divided the personal property and each
should be awarded the personalty now in their respective possession as a full and complete
property settlement.
6. The court finds that Petitioner is employed by Capital Roofing and in 1997
earned $19,060 gross. The court further finds that Respondent is employed by a nursing home
and earns $7.75 per hour and works 40 hours a week. The court finds that the better evidence
with regard to Respondent's earnings is the amount set forth in the financial declaration
submitted by Respondent to the clerk in the sum of $800.00 per month.
7. The court finds that Petitioner's and Respondent's needs are as set forth in
their respective Financial Declarations.
8. The court finds that Respondent has not co-habited since the separation.
9. The court finds that the parties separated in August of 1996.
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10. The court finds that because of the disparity of income of the parties that
Petitioner should pay to the Respondent as alimony the sum of $200.00 per month retroactive
to August of 1996 and continuing until Respondent's remarriage or co-habitation or until the
expiration of five years, whichever occurs first.
11. The court finds that Petitioner should pay to Respondent delinquent support
that has accrued during the past seventeen months or $3,400.00 at the rate of $100.00 per
month. The delinquent support and continuing alimony of $200.00 a month shall commence on
the 25th day of March, 1998, and shall be payable on the 10th and 25th of each month thereafter
until the further order of the court or the expiration of the five years or remarriage or
cohabitation, whichever occurs first.
12. The court finds that because of the disparity of income that Petitioner should
pay the judgment against the Respondent in favor of Knight Adjustment Bureau representing the
U.S. West telephone obligation in the sum of $1,120 and Petitioner should hold Respondent
harmless from said debt.
The court having made in writing its Findings of Fact,
NOW ENTERS THE FOLLOWING:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to a decree of divorce from the
Respondent.
2. The court concludes that Respondent has not cohabited.
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441 South State, #16
Orem, Utah 84058
Mill WIN I'lLASh IAKI Nnl 1<'!• Ihal Ihr iindusnuR-d

Aii.imn lm IVli-

tioner, will submit the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the
Honnrahic i..«

:auiii!.u.

date ol tins

piu^- three >?>) da\s to; -'..iiling. unless written ohteciion i^ nieu prior n> that

NOIKV

time, pursuant

.....

•

* -••

nn loin

•"• ''

HI iuuniij Viiiiinr nation

'

Kmdh in rin sourself

accordingly.
DAI 1.1) (hi>,

1^

dav ol Miiidi

IWN

ROBLRTI M001j)Y
Attorno. i'. * Petitioner
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cohabits one doesn't get alimony.
THE COURT:

In this matter I am going to

grant the petitioner a divorce on the basis of
irreconcilable differences, and I will require each
party to pay their own debts and obligations, with the
exception of the telephone bill owed to United
Adjustment Bureau, which has been reduced to a
judgment lien in the amount of $1122, which the
petitioner shall assume and pay and hold the defendant
harmless there from.

I'm going to require that he

make that full payment within 60 days from today's
date.
MR. MOODY:

Can he make a satisfactory

arrangement with them rather than 60 days?
THE COURT:

Yes, he can satisfy that

directly with them within 6 0 days -- I see what you're
suggesting.
MR. MOODY:

If he contacted them and they

agreed to take a monthly payment.
THE COURT:

Any objection to that?

MS. ORTIZ: No, I don't have any objection
to that, but I would like (inaudible) if I was going
to be granted a divorce, maybe I can go back to using
my name, Paskett.
THE COURT: Any objection to that request?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"J

;

sat i siry

that -- he'll just, hold her narmiess irom :n.o
obi igat J i HI „ then

ind sat>

*

--i Adjustment Bureau

* * nose payments.
As r- * r-~ rrusehc.n : - m i Lure
• hi c l e s ,

juriently

•

~ - .:r

'

h a v e in m e ; r p o s s e s s i o n .
As * •" ' ne -i 1 " ""on*

,- i •_ i

furnishings

.irsparir .

.: i ,: . .. - * * •*

-

issu<~•

" ,ir f : r :
* <•-

; a r r i a g e , and b a s e d upon *.
^ c \ a "at i on

: : nei -MMxaj^s ab ScrL : : :
i^~" a r a t i on of

•

$83 5 53

m

.. .*. ;.ui
' :

*;: .
• ^

:

earnings

$1°^ ^ a raoiiim,

: -...i..

~:c : m ; :

' •

matter.
I'll award the defendant the alimony she's
requesting o;t $^Uu d niouUi I i ui Mi*. time I. IUJI. hr left"
in August of 1996 until such time as she remarries or
r.ohribl trates or f i VP years, whichever occurs first
will specifically find that the incidents regaidiny
the males to this point have not constituted
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1

cohabitation.

2

I'll require each party to bear their own

3

costs and attorneys fees in this action.

4

any other items that we need an order on, Mr. Moody?

5
6

MR. MOODY:

Well, let me (inaudible) if I

may clarify.

7

THE COURT: Yes.

8

MR. MOODY:

9
10

Are there

I would suggest that alimony --

she didn't come in for temporary alimony, we don't go
backwards to 1996.

11

THE COURT:

I'll allow you to speak to that.

12

MR. MOODY:

If the Court wants to award her

13

five years alimony, I certainly think that's

14

(inaudible) discretion of the Court, but to impose

15

upon him alimony backwards -- I mean how we have a

16

lump sum -- if he obviously can't pay, he can't pay

17

the telephone bill.

18

to pay five years alimony, it should begin in the

19

month of March or April of 1998 and go for five years.

20
21

If the Court wants to order him

THE COURT:

Why do you believe that, Mr.

MR. MOODY:

Well, because she didn't come in

Moody?

22
23

and get a temporary order to penalize him to reduce it

24

to a judgment back to August of 1996 to the present

25

time.

That just penalizes him and it makes him
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sne makes $. ;0 and he makes $1900
• .~,r~r-«-r

not

• her financial

1
1'

^i
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V*' * /- .'"* 1
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i UJ-
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. ^ ?fr

^v^T.

1
1-

vas supposes .

19

didn't know

"*?nr Honor, T didn't: know that I

. ; ^ r a,.yir^::g with tiie Cou i I

I

what did you call it, I needed • >

20
MR

21
22

MOODY:
ORTIZ

A temporary order..
temporary order,

I don't, know

i i i i" I "I 1 ed i HI,Mr i I in-1

23

\A '

24

financial declaration, an? this has kind of all been a

on

I

. . .

:;:i-....r , rocess for me

I put on. the back of
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it that that's what I had asked for.

That was the

first time I knew that I was to do anything except for
ask for the stipulations and the (inaudible) sent to
you.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Moody, I'm going to base it on the $835
she shows in her financial declaration.

I'll also

find, however, that in the event she were making the
$12 0 0 a month which you referred to, that it would
still justify the amount of $200 a month.
I am going to require the alimony payment
from August of 1996.

I will, however, provide that he

can pay the delinquency that has accrued to the
current date at the rate of -- what would be a
satisfactory amount to you, ma'am?
MS. ORTIZ:

I'm not sure (inaudible).

THE COURT:

I'm going to allow him to pay

the amount that's accrued thus far to this date in
payments to you.
MS. ORTIZ:

That's fine.

THE COURT:

Is there an amount of payment

that would be acceptable to you?
MS. ORTIZ:

I don't know, is it by monthly,

THE COURT:

I'm going to require it monthly.

is it--
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months,

Till a t s p r o b a b,3 } r (i n„a i id :i b,]l • 2)

ORTIZ :

MS
y o u ki ,

A-

THE ,-^c

You/ v e got. o n g o i n g o f

"*?••"

hi I! 1f-IIl
delinquency

toh ~z I

just

(amount

OP r-p — rr

MS
maybe

$300

'-

payment

$2 0 0 a.

w a r d s 1:

..ill

--

Wei 1, h e

C

ould just

add

like

( i n a u d i b,] e) *

THE ZC •JET

- ...

f::i

'A'l .

-

* *'

« : : . *u t h a t

delinquency to

4

ei month, and the first

^ug^i^y ana Jt. ..quency snail be paid

w,i thin * v^ days fmir t .->ria\ - iate
let : s

In other words,

'- --.:.

p a r t y w:v; -'"

rurther quesrions
iL

--- *

"a-,—_- *

u i s s u e s that, e i t h e r

' "*~ "^urt?

c o n c l u s i o n and c^cree c o n s i s t e n t * • ;: r hat
"T

••

rder-

t r e a judgment

for

delinquency?
THE COURT:

No, I've allowed h:rr * -. -v - :>~-

r'.rst payment due w:in ; ;.e rirsr. a-imony pa\7ne:*; -.:*
f ;^-=» ^a^'=

So he's going to be paying $3 0 0 a month

-•- ts the delinquency pa i d • ai id t::l len :i t M „ i 1! 1
drop ccwn *o the $200 a month until she™FJR

MOODY i

it wi.1.1 run tor five years from,,
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August of 1995?
THE COURT:

August of 1996.

MR. MOODY:

Excuse me, August of 1996.

THE COURT:

Five years or until she

remarries or cohabitates, whichever occurs first, and
as I've indicated so there's no issue, I've found that
the incidences occurring to this date do not
constitute cohabitation.
MS. ORTIZ: That's what I wanted to make
sure that I know for sure what you mean by
cohabitating, moving in together; is that correct?
THE COURT:

That's correct, residing

together as man and wife.
MS. ORTIZ: Okay.
MR. MOODY:

Thank you, your Honor.

MS. ORTIZ: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

(Hearing concluded)
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Robert i MO<H:: NO. 2302
MOODY & BROWN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 373-2721

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ('<•: R!

>t- UIAH COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

JOSE RAFAEL ORTIZ-URIBE,

FINANCIAL DECLARATK >N

Plaintiff.

LAURIE ORTIZ-URIBE

Civil No. 974402506

Defendant

Dated 3/5/98

Husband: Jose Rafael Ortiz-Uribe
Address: 250 West Center Street
PI. Grove. UT 84062
Soc. Sec. No.:
Occupation: Roofer
Employer: Capital Roofing
Birthdate: 8-24-63
NOTE:

Wife: Laurie Ortiz-Un be
Address;
441 S. State.t#16
Orem. UT 84057
Soc. Sec. No
Occupation.
Employer:
Birthdate-

This Declaration must be riled with the Domestic Calendar Clerk. 5 days prior to the Pre-Tnai Hearing. Failure by either
party to complete, present, and tile this form as required will authorize the Court to accept the statement ot the other
party as the basis tor its decision,
Any false statement
the Court.

it

ai id may be considered a fraud upon
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STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS, AND LIABILITIES
(Note: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4.3;
if figures are on a bi-weekly basis, multiply by 2.167)
WIFE

HUSBAND
Gross monthly income from:
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses, allowances and
overtime, payable
(pay period)

1

$1960.00

Pensions and retirement
Social security
Disability and unemployment insurance
Public assistance (welfare, A F D C payment, etc.)
Child support from any prior marriage
Dividends and interest
Rents
A l l other sources: (Specify)

- Alimony $250, Medical Insurance

pursuant to Decree $63
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME

$1960.00

Itemize monthly deductions from gross income:
*« '*

State and federal income taxes

|

Number of exemptions taken
Social security
Medical or other insurance (describe fully)
Union or other dues
Retirement or pension fund
Savings plan
i

Credit union
Other: (specify)
|

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS

1

NET MONTHLY INCOME—TAKE HOME PAY

$

$

1

$1500.00

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS
Creditor *s Name

For

Date Payable

Balance

Digitized
by the
Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
TOTAL DEBTS
AND
OBLIGATIONS
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Monthly Payment

A L L PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES KNOWN 1 0 ME
Owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held (H) Husband. (W) Wife, (J) Jointly).

0.

VALUE

(a)

OWED THEREON

Household furnishings, furniture, appliances, and equipment
A111 o m o b i 1 e f Ye ar- M a ke)

(b)
i

1

Securities—Stocks. Bonds

s

!' ' "ash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings and loans, credit unions— savings and checking)

—

•

—

-

•

-

-

—

L;ie Insurance

(e)
i

Policy No

\.'ompan\ Name

face Amount

Cash value, accumulated
Jividend. or loan amount

-

—- - —

1

1
Profit Sharing or Retire ment Accounts

Value ot interest and amount presently

Name
il Name
ig)
Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, attach sheet with identical information for all additional
property)
1 ype of Property
Address:
Date of Acquisition
Original Cost $__
Total Present Value $_
Cost of Additions $_
Basis of Valuation
Total Cost $
"
Mortgage Balance $__
Other Liens S_ ,
Equity $ _
Monthly Amortization S_
And to whom
Taxes $
Individual contributions $
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(h)

Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness)

(i)

Other assets (Specify)

6.TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES
Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose
expenses are included:

WIFE

HUSBAND

1

$250.00

Rent or mortgage payments (residence)
Real property taxes (residence)
Real property insurance (residence)
I Maintenance (residence)
Food and household supplies

450.00

Utilities including water, electricity', gas. and heat
Telephone

100.00

Laundry and cleaning

50.00

Clothing

50.00

•

'
•, •

Medical

[| Dental
Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive liability, disability)
Exclude payroll deducted - Health Insurance
Child Care
Payment of child spousal support re: prior marriage

II School
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel, and recreation)

50.00

i

11

100.00

Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations) - Misc.
Transportation (other than automobile)

350.00

Auto expense (gas. oil. repair, insurance)
Installment payment(s). (Insert total and attach itemized schedule if
|| not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof)
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule) || Credit Card and Charge Accounts
TOTAL EXPENSES

$
SI 400.00
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SIGNED on the date written above.

ROBERT L. M O e r v
Attorney for Plaiiu.ii

JOSE RAFAEI ORTIZ-URIBE
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FINANCIAL DECLARATION
Plaintiff
vs.

Civil No.

IduztO lyti O&iz. iJeJRtr
'

Defendant

Husband:
Address:

Wife:
hui&i^ L^N t)tt^Utojij?
Address: 4 f l ^ > A ^ <sfedtf ^ **Hlb

Soc. Sec. No
Occupation:__
Employer
Birthdate:

Birthdate:'1

Qtem 3Jldr
Wt ftffSff
r ^ b > SPj l^k3

NOTE: This declaration must be filed with the domestic calendar clerk 5 days
prior to the pre-trial hearing.
Failure by either party to complete,
present, and file this form as required will authorize the Court to accept
the statement of the other party as the basis for its decision. Any false
statement made hereon shall subject you to the penalty for perjury and may be
considered a fraud upon the Court.
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES:
Note: To arrive at monthly figures when income is
received and deductions are made weekly, multiply
4.3; if figures are on a bi-weekly basis, multiply
by 2.167.
1.
Gross monthly income from:
Salary and wages, including commissions,
bonuses, allowances and overtime.
Payable: _
r, Pay Period:
At , . . i
Pensions and retirement
r&ujBeLL ^£*£ptS
Social Security
Disability and unemployment insurance
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payments
etc.
Child support from any prior marriage
Dividends and interest
All other sources (specify)
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME

^Vflr^s on each pog^uI
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Husband

Wife

CX^tr* r Z>
cyoSr Q-o

_____

$5£T<S~3>

Wife
itemize m c n t m y deductions LVY ir:;sr income:
State and f- ieral income taxes
Number of exempt - ^ ^ 4 ^V-^n
Social Security
Medical or other insurance t d e s c n i i
. )
4life, 'r-a- ! m-dira~ dis^bil^tv
Union or oti-'er dues
Retirement •: pension fund
Savings Plan
Credit Union
Other (specif y) •• Re t: i rement i can

_____
_____ ._

,X i J c^
_ _ _ _

)45~. |S~

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCT LoNi!

(M3B

Net monthly income - t a k e home p a y
Lc_

.

..

:

Creditor s *

^

13 J ,33
~~&~~„
j 1 * P)Q

FOP

"ATF : .-'• A.:

BAuAMCL

MONTHLY
PAYMENT

^Ge eA^ooaX L*Jr A
\ > hfe ^ ~7_ neTXP&s'

TOTAL
If insutix-,..;:. -:; •.
attach schedulei

* rmtrr* —^
, xxiserL total and

All prope±.-,..v V^L Lr.,e r^.i;..:e^ M:..JW-.. L O be owned individually or jointly
(indicate who holds or how title heJd;
i H'» husband (Wi Wife or (J)
Jointly)
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE
ATTACH A SEPARATE SCHEDULE.
VALJTF
Household furnishing, furniture,
appliances and equipment
(b) Automobile (Year-Make)

OWED

(a)

ZZZZ^
{c)

iQ^QOO

.' ^<DQ ~

S ecu I i t i e si

Stocks\bonds

2
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-IT

1&—

(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks,
savings & loans, credit unions savings and checking)

Ci^/j^n^

$> / dfy

{\<rrawr)r % hv^r S^U^P^K

*>j-^r~

(e) Life Insurance:
Name of Company

Policy No.

Face Amount

Fn^r\cZl
Cash Value
accumulated
dividend
or Loan Amount

^

(f) Profit Sharing or Retirement Accounts:

Value of Interest
Amount of presently vested

Name : fc^
Name :
^Cy
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (Specify)

(h) Real Estate

(where more than one parcel of real estate owned,
information for all additional property)
.,

Original Cost
$ UPDO
cost or Additions $
Cost of Additions $
Total Cost

$ aJQOO

Type of Property MflbiL ^ p p n A , Y\UO
Date of Acquisition r\ua iHffin
Total Present Value $ ^^GTDO « °rO
Basis or valuation
Basis of Valuation,.

.,
- &Q ~

* *D

Qjr^n\iAi\sS^^>Z.

Mortgage
Balance $_
$
z_
Other Liens
Equity
$
And to whom_
Monthly Amortiz. $_
Taxes
$_
Ind. contributions$_
(i) Business Interest (Indicate name, share, type of business, value
less indebtedness
^

=

(j) Other Assets (specify)

I

3
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6.
Total month] y expenses;
(Specify which party is the custodial parent
and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose expenses
are included: _ L P^AQAJL Jx/N P R T T X . /,^/fteT _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Husband
_ _ _
_

Wife

Rent or mortgage payments (residence)
££3QJJ3L
Real property taxes (residence)
_____
Real property insurance (residence)
Maintenance (residence)
_____
SU* Gl)
Food and household supplies
.
/ 00 . &Q
Utilities including water, e l e c , gas & heat
.
__
I DO - *D
Telephone
...
Laundry and i:.I caning
_.
tfQ.
&0
Clothing
_
M e d i c a l '
________
__
Dental
____
_ _ _
Insurance (life, health, accident,
comprehensive disabi1ity)
Exc1ude
payrol 1 deducted
*
_.. „.
..„, . _
Child care
_ _ _ . „,
Payment of child/spousal support re prior
marriage
_ _
, _ _
School
•
._
_
Entertainment (includes clubs, social
obiigat ions , travel, recreat ion)
_____
Incidentals (gr oomi ng,, tobacco, a 1 c oho I g :i f t
donations, including tithing)
_____
, _____
Transportation (other than automobile)
______ _
_______
.Auto expenses (gas oil repa: -- -~^ura: •-.-:
______
IDO*(XO
Auto payments
Installment payments (insert rota, and attach
TOTAL
EXPENSES
itemized
schedule r
' *\*~ Z •• n - ' ^ o r t !
(4)
_ _ _ _
I declare
under penalty
perjury
that •or.
ataiforegoing, :i ncluding any
Other expenses
(insert of
to*:a'
m d specify
attachments are true and correct and that this declaration, was executed on
attached sheet)
.____ „
the
day of
_______ ....
I9 Q s :*::

Attorney signature
(Plaintiff or Defendant)

Party's

(yxki /JJUL.

sid'narf.&re--^

BRING TO THE PRETRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION
NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION, INCLUDING BUT
NOT LIMITED TO PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX
RETURNS, CREDIT UNION STATMENTS, PASSBOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS,
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES A N D OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION.
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